Author: Agung Riyardi, Didit Purnomo, Muchamad Iksan, Bana Handaga, Muhammad Nur Abdul Aziz, Alif Amru Ramadhan, Fristyan Yuris Meilita, Feri Setiawan and Dita Fitria Wati

Abstract: The Nash equilibrium applications encounter novelty, content, and visibility problems. This study aims to design and operate the Nash equilibrium interactive application, inspect the multi-case interdependency payoff matrices, and test the Nash equilibrium. The methods are designing and operating an interactive application, establishing through simulation Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag, and Rabbit Hunting, and Price Strategy payoff matrices and testing by Runs test the equilibrium in the payoff matrices. The results show that the MIEIA has four interesting features and successfully produces 25 appropriate payoff matrices for each case. Another result is that the Runs test provides Z scores -2,62 and -3,27 that prove the Nash equilibrium in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag and Rabbit Hunting cases, and -0,23 that prove the non-Nash equilibrium in the Price Strategy. All results discuss the importance of a sophisticated Nash equilibrium application that has an impact in solving problems in various sectors regarding decision making which is constrained by the risk aversion strategy.

Keywords:  Nash Equilibrium Application; Pricing Strategy; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Stag and Rabbit Hunting; Runs Test